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ENFORCING TAKINGS CLAUSES IN CHINA 
CHENG Jie 
INTRODUCTION 
Property rights are considered fundamental in constitutional 
jurisprudence and essential for economic development. However, 
China’s economic growth over the past 30 years has posed a special 
paradox to many theorists: for some, it is a mysterious phenomenon 
that China could continue rapid growth for a few decades without 
proper contract law until 1999 and without constitutional private 
property rights until after 2004. For others, the lack of property rights 
explains the social unrests arising from land-taking and the potential 
risk of non-sustainability of further development.  
This does not mean that there is no property protection in China; 
both the Constitution and other relevant laws provide for property 
rights. However, it is the security of property rights taht is 
questioned. Not only do individuals find themselves vulnerable when 
government agencies (the State) take their property, but also 
collective organizations in rural areas fail to resist expropriation 
requests from the State. According to the original text of Article 10 
of the 1982 Constitution, “The state may in the public interest take 
over land for its use in accordance with the law. No organization or 
individual may expropriate, buy, sell or lease land, or unlawfully 
transfer land in other ways. ” It was not until 2004 when the 20th and 
22nd Amendment of the Constitution added compensation to the 
original clause.   
Among other things, real property, especially land property rights 
are especially fragile because individuals are not considered 
landowners under the Chinese legal system. According to the 1982 
Constitution, in urban areas, all land belongs to the state. In the rural 
areas, land belongs to the state or collective organizations. In both 
urban and rural areas, individuals only have a land-use right. What is 
more, collective organizations in rural areas cannot transfer 
ownership freely. They can only passively transfer their land 
ownership to the state when the latter expropriates the land. After the 
state expropriates the land from rural areas, individuals or private 
sectors can acquire land-use rights from the government or from the 
market. As a result, there is no spontaneous market for land price and 
the government will only compensate the collective landowners with 
the minimal government-set price. In other words, the government 
has a monopoly over prices for all land owned by the collective, 
which is highly distorted and below the actual market price.  
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Observers and experts have noticed the problems associated with 
land property rights in China. Many have proposed reforms to 
address the distortion. Among them, there are three main approaches: 
the most radical one is to privatize land ownership both in urban 
areas and in rural areas.1 Many economists believe that the property 
ownership is the ultimate reason for the distortion. However, due to 
the perceived conflict between privatization and socialism, this 
approach has not been officially endorsed.  
The second approach is legalistic, which advocates to limit 
expropriation by a narrow interpretation of “public interests” in the 
law. 2  This approach was endorsed by the 2004 Constitution 
Amendment; and the 2011 Regulations on Expropriation and 
Compensation of Real Property on State-owned Land in Urban Areas 
provides a list of projects that are considered to be within public 
interests.  
The third approach is a constitutional due process of law 
approach. This approach requires the government to go through 
important bargaining and assessment procedures and to make the 
results public with due care.3 Up till now this approach has not been 
ratified by the Constitution. However, relevant ministerial procedures 
have been introduced to reflect the procedural requirements that 
emphasize fairness, neutrality and openness.  
This article aims to examine the effectiveness of the third 
approach through a systematic analysis of over 200 court cases that 
involve Articles 46-49 of the Land Management Law, as amended in 
2004. These articles were chosen for several reasons. Firstly, these 
articles are the de fecto due process of law provisions that restrict 
government land-taking actions substantively and procedurally. 
 
 1 Huang Shaoan (黄少安), Sun Shengmin (孙圣民) & Gong Mingbo (宫明波), Zhongguo Tudi 
Chanquan Zhidu Dui Nongye Jingji Zengzhang de Yingxiang—Dui 1949-1978 Nian Zhongguo Dalu 
Nongye Shengchan Xiaolü de Shizheng Fenxi (中国土地产权制度对农业经济增长的影响——对
1949—1978年中国大陆农业生产效率的实证分析) [The Impact of Land Ownership Structure on 
Agricultural Economic Growth: An Empirical Analysis on Agricultural Production Efficiency on the 
Chinese Mainland (1949-1978)], 3 ZHONGGUO SHEHUI KEXUE (中国社会科学) [SOC. SCI. CHINA] 38, 
38-47 (2005); Matthew S. Erie, China’s (Post) Socialist Property Rights Regime: Assessing The Impact 
of the Property Law on Illegal Land Takings, 37 H.K. L.J. 919, 919-49 (2007) (outlining the 
anti-commons (privatization) model and fuzzy approach (maintenance of a hierarchical order of rights 
among various players of rural land market) in modeling property law reform in China); see also Zhu 
Keliang & Roy Prosterman, Securing Land Rights for Chinese Farmers: A Leap Forward for Stability 
and Growth, 3 DEV. POL’Y ANALYSIS (Oct.15, 2007), http://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/ 
DPA3.pdf. 
 2 Hu Jinguang (胡锦光) & Wang Kai (王锴), Lun Woguo Xianfa Zhong “Gonggong Liyi” de 
Jieding (论我国宪法中“公共利益"的界定) [Defining Public Interest in the Chinese Constitution], l 
ZONGGUO FAXUE (中国法学) [CHINA L. SCI.] 18, 18-27, (2005). 
 3 Zhang Qianfan (张千帆), “Gongzheng Buchang” yu Zhengshouquan de Xianfa Xianzhi (“公正补
偿”与征收权的宪法限制) [Just Compensation and Constitutional Control of Takings Power], 2 
ZHONGUO FAXUE YANJIU (中国法学研究) [CHINESE J.L.] 25, 25-37 (2005). 
CHENG (DO NOT DELETE) 15/9/4 2:08 AM 
192 TSINGHUA CHINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7:189 
Secondly, these provisions are enforceable in China. Even if the 
Constitution is amended in the future, it is worthwhile to examine the 
enforcement of Land Management Law. Because Chinese courts 
generally do not apply constitutional provisions in their 
adjudications. Thirdly, Compared with the 2007 Property Law, the 
Land Management Law as revised in 2004 is more relevant for land 
taking control. The Property Law has only very limited impact on 
regulating land taking. 4  This is because disputes between the 
government and individuals are considered as administrative disputes 
rather than civil disputes. Therefore, the Property Law does not apply 
in land taking cases. At the same time, a substantial body of court 
decisions that apply the provisions of the Land Management Law has 
developed, rendering the neglect of the enforcement and judicial role 
in land disputes less and less tenable.   
It is worthwhile to elaborate on the four articles before we move 
on to the main contents of this paper. Property rights are considered 
exclusive in modern jurisprudence. The exclusiveness means that, 
without due process, government expropriation of land property is 
considered unjustified. This is reflected in the requirements of 
Articles 46-49 of Land Management Law.  Among the four articles, 
three place procedural limits on land expropriation and one on 
compensation. Article 46 expressly requires that the expropriation be 
approved through legal procedures, and be announced by the 
people’s governments at or above the county level, which 
government entities are also to implement the expropriation. Article 
47 provides for the computation of compensations for land, 
constructions and plants above the land and other relevant loss, 
including expected profit in the future. Article 48 provides for the 
publicity obligations of the local government once the plan for 
compensation and resettlement subsidies are decided. According to 
Article 48, the plan must be made available to the general public and 
the relevant government entities must “solicit comments and 
suggestions from the collective economic organizations, the land of 
which is expropriated, and the peasants.” Article 49 imposes another 
publicity obligation on collective organizations, which are asked to 
“make known to its members the income and expenses of the 
compensation received for land expropriation”.  Therefore, the four 
articles as a whole serve the role of due process of law in the Chinese 
legal system. 
This article will develop into the following three parts: Part I 
introduces the methodology and basic findings from the empirical 
 
 4 Mo Zhang, From Public to Private: The Newly Enacted Chinese Property Law and the Protection 
of Property Rights in China, 5 BERKLEY BUS. L.J., 317, 317-63 (2008). 
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study. Part II summarizes the judicial understanding of the ‘taking’s 
clauses’, and highlights various points of consistency and 
inconsistency with such an understanding. Part III then makes 
several observations regarding why the courts tend to interpret the 
takings provisions against certain types of land right holders, and 
regarding recent developments from the perspective of judicial 
policy. I will then conclude and discuss the policy implications of the 
judicial enforcement of the takings’ clauses in China.  
I. METHODOLOGY AND BASIC FINDINGS  
This part sets out the methodology and the basic findings from the 
case study. Methodologies applied in this article are both quantitative 
and qualitative. There have been other case studies of Chinese land 
disputes, but most investigate one or a few cases in a specific 
region.5 Although they enrich our understanding of the government 
(including the judiciary) practice in dealing with land disputes, it is 
questionable whether the specific cases are representative and to 
what degree judges would apply the same rationale behind the cases 
examined to other cases. There have also been empirical studies of 
land disputes by economists and political scientists.6 These studies 
help us understand the social and political background of land 
disputes, but they do not intend to analyze the variations with which 
lawyers are concerned: governing principles and rules, the scope of 
the rights and interests, and rationales behind the judicial 
understanding of rights and obligations.  
This article attempts to improve the empirical study of Chinese 
land disputes by providing a more complete picture of land property 
right disputes in China. It does so by examining over 200 cases 
between 2004 and 2010 available in the public database, 
Chinalawinfo.com. 7  From a pure methodological perspective, 
compared with empirical research that collected cases from media 
reports,8 or from one or a few specific regions,9 the case sample 
 
 5 E.g., Eva Pils, Land Disputes, Rights Assertion, and Social Unrest in China: A Case from 
Sichuan, 19 COLUM. J. ASIAN L., 235, 240-244 (2005); Zhang Jing (张静), Tudi Shiyong Guize de 
Buqueding: Yi Ge Jieshi Kuangjia (土地使用规则的不确定:一个解释框架) [Uncertainty of Land-use 
Rules: An Explanatory Framework], 1 ZHONGGUO SHEHUI KEXUE (中国社会科学) [SOC. SCI. CHINA], 
113, 113-124 (2003). 
 6 Keliang & Prosterman, supra note 2; Loren Brandt, Scott Rozelle & Mathew Turner, Local 
Government Behavior and Property Rights Formation in Rural China, 160(4) J. INST’L & 
THEORATICAL ECON.,627, 627-671 (2004); Klaus Deininger & Songqing Jin, Securing Property Rights 
in Transition: Lessons for Implementation of China’s Rural Land Contracting Law, 70 J. ECON. BEHAV. 
& ORG., 22, 22-38 (2009). 
 7 See CHINA L. INFO., www.chinalawinfo.com (last visited Apr. 21, 2015). 
 8 E.g., Benjamin Liebman collected 223 defamation cases from Internet reports, see Benjamin 
Liebman, Innovation Through Intimidation: An Empirical Account of Defamation Litigation in China, 
CHENG (DO NOT DELETE) 15/9/4 2:08 AM 
194 TSINGHUA CHINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 7:189 
collected here is likely to be less biased and more complete. While 
there are still many ways in which the sample is not 
representative—for example, many of the cases are from the same 
province while some provinces do not have even one case—we 
believe that, overall, our dataset improves the representativeness of 
empirical studies of land property law.   
Since court decisions are not required to make public in China, 
there is no access to all relevant cases from official databases. As a 
result, the cases collected by Chinalawinfo.com are not complete and 
may not represent all the cases in China. Since 2009, some provincial 
courts, such as Henan and Shanghai started to publish their court 
decisions. Ever since then, collecting a sample of court opinions in 
land-taking cases from a single court or courts of certain regions 
might be possible. However, it would not be representative of cases 
nationwide; and it might reflect regional biases. By contrast, as a 
business legal information provider, Chinalawinfo.com has tried to 
collect as many as possible cases, as well as most published court 
decisions across various channels, including those provided by courts 
exclusively to Chinalawinfo.com.  
In the beginning, all cases that have applied Land Management 
Law Articles 46-49 between 1998-2011 as of Nov. 30 2011 were 
retrieved. But no cases before 2004 and after 2010 were documented 
as of Nov. 30 2011. As a result, all the cases actually retrieved are 
between 2004-2010.10 The time frame was thus set for three reasons. 
Firstly, this is the period during which land property laws began to 
promulgate and come into force. The original 1986 Land 
Management Law mainly focused on the administrative control of 
land use. In 1998, the Implementation Regulation for the Land 
Management Law was passed by the State Council, which laid out 
detailed procedural requirements for land expropriation and 
compensation. More generally, more weight was given to 
 
47(1) HARV. INT'L L.J. 33, 37 (2006) (acknowledging the obvious problems of reliance of media reports 
of cases). 
 9 E.g., Eva, supra note 5; Margaret Y.K. Woo & Yaxin Wang, Civil Justice in China: An Empirical 
Study of Courts in Three Provinces, 53(4) AM. J. COMP. L. 911, 911-40 (2005). 
 10 The Supreme Court Gazette published a couple of cases in 2005, which are not included in the 
above-mentioned 204 cases. Two civil cases were administrative cases regarding land-taking decisions 
which were published ever since 1998, and the Court supported the plaintiffs, see Chen Qingzong Su 
Tingyangcun Yizu, Tingyangcun Cunweihui Zhengdi Buchangkuan Fenpei Jiufen An (陈清棕诉亭洋
村一组、亭洋村村委会征地补偿款分配纠纷案) [Chen Qingzong v. Group One of Tingyang Village 
and Tingyang Villagers’ Committee], 2005 Sup. People’s Ct. Gaz. 10 (Fujian Xiamen City Interm. 
People’s Ct. 2003); Beishapocun Cunweihui Su Xi’an Shi Gaoxin Jishu Chanye Kaifaqu Dongqu 
Guanweihui Deng Tuoqian Zhengdikuan Jiufen An (北沙坡村村委会诉西安市高新技术产业开发区
东区管委会等拖欠征地款纠纷案) [Beishapo Villagers’ Committee v. East Administration Committee 
of Xi’an Municipal High-Tech Industrial Development Region], 2005 Sup. People’s Ct. Gaz. 1 (Sup. 
People’s Ct. 2003). 
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compensations for land taking and the control of government 
misconduct—especially by local governments—in land 
administration. In 2004, the Land Management Law was revised 
after the Constitution was amended, which echoed the expression of 
the 20th Amendment. The 2007 Property Law does the same. In 
2011, the Regulation on the Expropriation and Compensation of 
Houses on Urban State-Owned Land replaced the Regulation on the 
Demolition of Urban Houses. The title of the regulation makes it 
clear that this is a right-based real estate regulation. 
Secondly, this period witnessed rapid economic growth and a 
shift in public policy from a focus on efficiency to more attention to 
fairness. From 1997-2004, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
followed the principle of “taking account of fairness while keeping 
efficiency as the priority”.11 After 2004, however, the policy became 
“emphasizing efficiency for primary allocation; emphasizing fairness 
for reallocation”. 12  Accordingly, the courts were asked to play 
different roles over time, alternatively to “protect the sail of the 
economy” or “to promote a harmonious society”. Judicial polices 
over land disputes changed over time to reflect changing social and 
economic policies.  
Last but not least, this period of time overlapped with the 
implementation of the Five-Year Reform Outlines of the Supreme 
People’s Court (the SPC hereinafter). The first five-year reform 
lasted from 1999 to 2004, and the second from 2004 to 2009. The 
current five-year reform started in 2009 and will end in 2013. With 
the five-year outlines, the judiciary set various goals, aiming to 
transform itself from a bureaucratic organ to a professional and 
neutral authority. Therefore, examining the courts’ practice in 
adjudicating land disputes during this period provides an opportunity 
to observe the resolve and reality of the judiciary’s commitment to 
the rule of law and other goals. 
The basic findings are based on the research of the following 
aspects of the cases collected: (1) the type of litigation (civil, 
criminal or administrative), (2) the time and place of the dispute, (3) 
the land right holder’s identity (village, individual farmers, or other 
land users), (4) the result of the claim (success or failure), (5) the 
 
 11 Jianchi Xianlü Youxian, Jiangu Gongping (坚持效率优先,兼顾公平) [Insist the priority of 
efficiency with caring justice], Zhongguo Gongchandang Di Shisici Quanguo Daibiao Dahui Sanci 
Huiyi Baogao (中国共产党第十四次全国代表大会三次会议报告) [Report of CCP’s 3rd Session of 
the 14th Congress], (promulgated by CCP’s 3rd Session of the 14th Cong., effective 1993). 
 12 Chuci Fenpei Zhuzhong Xiaolv, Zaici Fenpei Zhuzhong Gongping (初次分配注重效率,再分配
注重公平) [emphasize efficiency in primary distribution and justice in redistribution], Zhongguo 
Gongchandang Di Shiqici Quanguo Daibiao Dahui Baogao(中国共产党第十七次全国代表大会报告) 
[Report of CCP’s 17th Congress], (promulgated by CCP’s 17th Cong., effective Oct 21, 2007). 
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legal ground of the court’s decision, and (6) the judicial policy 
underlying the court’s interpretation of relevant takings’ provisions. 
Among the cases found, 84 cases apply Article 46; 108 apply 
Article 47; and six cases are based on Articles 48 and 49 
respectively. Table 1 provides an overview of the cases studied. 
Table 2-1 to 2-4 present a more detailed distribution of cases related 
to the four articles. Some features are immediately noticeable. 
Firstly, most lawsuits were brought after 2006, suggesting the 
potential impact of the Constitutional Amendments, the enactment of 
the 2007 Property Law and the revision of the Land Management 
Law on the awareness of property rights and subsequently the law 
enforcement of land-taking clauses.  
Secondly, there is no significant difference in the numbers of 
cases adjudicated in more developed, eastern regions and those in 
less developed, middle and western regions. This suggests that the 
stage of economic development does not play an important role in 
judicial preference of land property rights, either procedurally or 
substantively. In other words, adjudications in different regions tend 
to be ‘consistent’ with each other, which imply the existence of 
underlying principles or policies behind the judicial behaviors.  
Thirdly, there are more civil cases (169) than administrative cases 
(35), and there are more cases applying Article 46 and Article 47 
than cases applying Article 48 and Article 49. Finally, the overall 
number of cases seems to have an inverted U-shape as it seems to 
rise between 2004-7 but then falls down again after 2007 (Chart 1).  
 
Table 1: Overview of Cases Analyzed 
 Tot
al 
% 
of 
tot
al 
Article 46 
Expropria
tion 
Procedur
es  
Article 47 
Computat
ion of 
Compens
ation 
Article 
48 
Publicit
y 
require
ment on 
the 
govern
ment 
Article 
49 
Publicit
y 
require
ment on 
the 
collectiv
e  
Total Case 
numbers 
204 100 84  108 6 6 
Civil cases 169 83 68  93 2 6 
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Administr
ative cases 
35 17 16 15 4 0 
 
Table 2-1: Time-Spatial Distribution of Cases Based on Article 
46 
Article 46 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Sum 
Sichuan  1  1    2 
Shandong  1      1 
Guangdong 1 1      2 
Hainan   2     2 
Hubei   1 1    2 
Zhejiang   1 2    3 
Jiangsu   1     1 
Yunnan     60 1 3 64 
Henan      3 1 4 
Chongqing      1  1 
Ningxia      1  1 
Hunan       1 1 
Total 1 3 5 4 60 6 5 84 
 
Table 2-2 Time-Spatial Distribution of Cases Based on Article 47 
Article 47 2004 2005 2006 2007 200
8 
2009 2010 Sum 
Anhui  1      1 
Heilongjiang 1       1 
Gansu   1     1 
Beijing      3  3 
Liaoning 2 1  1 1   5 
Shanxi  1     1 2 
Jinagxi    1    1 
Guangdong 2 4 14 2    22 
Sichuan   1  1 2   4 
Shandong  2 2     4 
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Fujian    1    1 
Hainan  2  18 1   21 
Hubei   1 1    2 
Zhejiang   1 2    3 
Yunnan    7 5 8  20 
Henan      7  7 
Hebei    1    1 
Chongqing  1  2  3  6 
Ningxia      1  1 
Hunan       1 1 
Qinghai 1       1 
Total 6 13 19 37 9 22 2 108 
 
Table 2-3 Time-Spatial Distribution of Cases Based on Article 48  
Article48 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Sum 
Beijing      1  1 
Yunnan      1  1 
Hubei    1    1 
Guangdong   1     1 
Zhejiang   1     1 
Shandong  1      1 
Total 0 1 2 1 0 2 0 6 
 
Table 2-4 Time-Spatial Distribution of Cases Based on Article 49 
Article49 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 Sum 
Henan      1 1 2 
Beijing      1  1 
Guangxi    1    1 
Guangdong  1 1     2 
 
Sum 
0 1 1 1 0 2 1 6 
 
Table 3:Case numbers divided according to year 
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Case Nos. in 
Total 
Article 
46 
Article4
7 
Article 
48  
Article4
9 
200
4 7 1 6 0 0 
200
5 18 3 13 1 1 
200
6 27 5 19 2 1 
200
7 43 4 37 1 1 
200
8 69 60 9 0 0 
200
9 32 6 22 2 2 
201
0 8 5 2 0 1 
 
Chart 1： The Inverted U-Shape of Case Numbers between 
2004-2010 
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Besides the findings of Part I, we also look into judicial 
preference in applying these clauses and the reasons behind the 
application.  
II. HOW JUDGES APPLY THE TAKINGS CLAUSES IN THEIR 
ADJUDICATIONS 
This part of the article investigates how judges apply the ‘takings’ 
clauses’ and highlights various points of consistency and 
inconsistency in the judicial implementation. Some findings emerge. 
Firstly, the courts tend to be more ‘neutral’ in adjudicating civil cases 
than in adjudicating administrative cases; and there seems to be clear 
preference of the interests of rural collective organization over 
private or individual claims. Secondly, Judges do not usually support 
property claims against procedural wrongs. Thirdly, in those cases 
that judges did support procedural justice, there are usually 
additional substantive reasons to invalidate the government 
decisions. Finally, courts tend to support collective property rights 
based on procedural reasons, or majority rule against individual right 
holders.  
A. Civil versus Administrative Litigation 
Among all the sample cases, 169 out of 204 cases are civil cases 
and only 35 are administrative cases. Moreover, as Table 3 below 
shows, if one compares the plaintiff success rates for the two types of 
litigation, the likelihood of a plaintiff win in civil litigation (brought 
against either a collective organization or another individual) is 
usually higher than in an administrative litigation.  
 
Table 3 Plaintiff Success Rate in the Litigation 
  Article 
46 
Article 
47 
Article 
48 
Article 
49 
Number of cases (civil 
and administrative cases 
combined) 
84  108 6 6 
Respective number of 
Civil and Admin Cases 
68, 16 93, 15 2,4  6, 0 
Number of cases with 
plaintiff success: civil and 
administrative 
0, 4  53, 7  1, 0 3, 0 
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respectively 
Rate of plaintiff success: 
total  
4.7% or 
(16%)13 
55% 17% 50% 
Rate of plaintiff success: 
Civil  
0 56% 50% 50% 
Rate of plaintiff success: 
Administrative 
25% 46% 0 0 
 
Less administrative litigations of course does comply with the 
general proportion of administrative cases among all lawsuits in 
China. However, given the large scale of land taking and social 
unrests generated by land taking, the numbers of administrative 
litigations are rather small and not proportionate. In deed, there are 
reasons to believe that less administrative litigations are the result of 
judicial policies that either reject administrative litigations in 
land-taking cases or reject individuals as the proper party to bring the 
lawsuit against the government.  
In 2002, the SPC made it clear that only disputes over 
compensation for attachments and young crops will be accepted as 
civil litigations. The reason given by the SPC is that these disputes 
are “disputes among equal parties.” However, land compensation 
disputes between the farmers and the collective organizations are 
excluded and are not considered as between equal entities. In the 
meanwhile, the SPC expressly instructed lower courts to reject  
judicial review of land taking cases but to leave them to the local 
administrative agencies to deal with.14  
Local courts followed the SPC’s instruction and refused to take 
many land disputes cases. The 2003 Guangxi High Court “Circular 
Regarding Cases that Courts Should Not Accept” illustrated the 
impact of the SPC vividly. 13 categories of cases, including land 
disputes, especially compensation disputes between farmers and 
collectives were listed as non-justiciable in Guangxi Province. When 
interviewed by curious reporters, the spokesman of the High Court 
explained that all these cases involve a wide range of people and tend 
 
 13 Percentage in parentheses reflects lower number of total cases when civil cases with the same fact 
patterns are counted as one. 
 14 Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Xu Zhijun Deng Shiyiren Su Longquan Shi Longyuan Zhen 
Dibacun Cunweihui Tudi Zhengyong Buchangfei Fenpei Jiufen Yian de Pifu (最高人民法院关于徐志
君等十一人诉龙泉市龙渊镇第八村村委会土地征用补偿费分配纠纷一案的批复) [2002 Supreme 
Court Response to Xue Zhijun and Other 11 People v. 8th Villager’s Committee of Longquan City 
Longyuan Township] (CHINA L. INFO.). 
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to trigger conflicts. These cases are difficult to adjudicate because 
they are complex, vexatious, and costly. Judgments are also difficult 
to enforce. “For example, cases such as land disputes involving 
women who have married out, compensations for dam construction 
immigrants, and disputes over tombs location for fengshui reasons 
lead to enforcement difficulties even if we accept them.” 15 
According to the report, the Circular was made after an incident 
caused by a court decision involved with illegal fund raising 
activities. After the court decision was rendered, 60 people were 
unable to claim their money back from the debtor who was in actual 
bankruptcy. Those people then surrounded the court and even 
harassed the judges, blaming the court for the consequence. As a 
matter of fact, it was not until 2011 that the SPC eventually 
determined that courts should accept administrative cases involving 
land disputes brought by individual farmers.16  
B. Judicial Tolerance of Procedural Wrongs  
In the sample cases, the courts rarely invalidate government 
decisions on expropriation for their procedural wrongs. Nor have 
procedural wrongs been the ground to overturn the decisions of 
collective organizations regarding the distribution of land 
compensation. Even when the plaintiffs won claims based on Article 
46, usually the courts decisions were made because the relevant 
agencies lacked the proper authorization according to the statutory 
law. Among the four sample cases, three of them involved with local 
governments that were not authorized to implement demolition of 
attachments on the expropriated land. According to Article 46, 
governments above county level are responsible for implementing 
the expropriation. In the three cases mentioned above, one street 
administration 17  and two township governments 18  decided to 
 
 15 Gan Bing (甘冰), Guangxi Gaoyuan Weihe Zanbu Shouli “Shisanlei Anjian” (广西高院为何暂
不受理“13类案件”) [Why Guangxi High Court Rejects 13 Categories of Cases for the Moment], 
ZHONGGUO QINGNIAN BAO (中国青年报) [CHINA YOUTH DAILY] (Aug. 24, 2004), available 
at http://zqb.cyol.com/gb/zqb/2004-08/24/content_935227.htm. 
 16 Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shenli Sheji Nongcun Jiti Tudi Xingzheng Anjian Ruogan Wenti 
de Guiding (最高人民法院关于审理涉及农村集体土地行政案件若干问题的规定) [Provisions of the 
Supreme People’s Court on Several Issues concerning the Trial of Administrative Cases Involving 
Rural Collectively-owned Land] (promulgated by Sup. People’s Ct. Aug. 7, 2011, effective Sep. 5, 
2011) art. 4 (CHINA L. INFO.). 
 17 Qiu Xiexing Su Hangzhou Shi Yuhang Qu Renmin Zhengfu Xingqiao Jiedao Banshichu 
Chengxiang Jianshe Xingzheng Qiangzhi An (裘谢兴诉杭州市余杭区人民政府星桥街道办事处城乡
建设行政强制案) [Qiu Xiexing v. Xingqiao Street Administration of Yuhang District, Hangzhou City] 
(Zhejiang Hangzhou Yuhang Dist. People’s Ct., Dec 13, 2007) (CHINA L. INFO.). 
 18 Zhou Yunfa Deng Su Taizhou Shi Jiaojiang Qu Renmin Zhengfu Qiangzhi Chaiqian Jiufen An 
(周云法等诉台州市椒江区人民政府强制拆迁纠纷案) [Zhou Yunfa and others v. Jiangjiang District 
of Taizhou City Government] (Zhejiang Taizhou Luqiao Dist. People’s Ct., Jun. 11, 2007) (CHINA L. 
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demolish houses on the expropriated land. In the fourth case, the 
local government de-registered 14 people’s land use certificates 
without authorization which also reflected the concern with the 
agency’s qualification rather than its procedural wrongs.19  
In one of the cases adjudicated by Yunnan High Court in 2009, 41 
households sought to invalidate the expropriation and compensation 
plan.20 According to the decision, Dongchuan District Government 
of Kunming City entered into agreement with the collective 
organization (the Shengou Village) and compensated the villagers in 
October 2006 before the Yunnan Provincial Government formally 
approved the expropriation projected in August 2007. After the 
compensation and resettlement plan were made public in August and 
October of 2007. The plaintiffs subsequently challenged the 
expropriation and compensation and asked the court to invalidate the 
relevant decisions on the ground of Articles 46, 47 and 48 of Land 
Management Law. Both first and second instance courts found 
procedural wrongs on the part of the Dongchuan Government, 
acknowledging that according to the Land Management Law and its 
Implementation Measures, the Dongchuan Government should have 
obtained higher level government approval and publicized the 
compensation and resettlement plan for comments before carrying 
out the expropriation. However, the courts declined to invalidate the 
expropriation decision and the compensation plan, on the grounds 
that Dongchuan Government was a qualified agency according to 
Article 46, and that the procedural wrongs brought no negative 
consequences to the legal interests of the plaintiffs.21  
 
INFO.); Boluo Xian Shiba Zhen Wuni Hu Cunmin Weiyuanhui Fuhoulongfu Gong Sige Cunmin 
Xiaozu Su Boluo Xian Renmin Zhengfu ji Boluo Xian Shiba Zhen Renmin Zhengfu Zhengdi Buchang 
Jiufen Xingzheng An(博罗县石坝镇乌坭湖村民委员会富厚龙富共四个村民小组诉博罗县人民政
府及博罗县石坝镇人民政府征地补偿行政纠纷案) [Four Villagers’ Groups of Wu Ni Hu Village v. 
Shiba Township Government of Boluo County], 3 RENMIN FAYUAN ANLI XUAN (人民法院案例选) 
[PEOPLE’S COURT CASE SELECTION] (2007) (Guangdong High Ct., Nov. 14, 2005). 
 19 Wang Chao Deng Shisi Ren Su Zhumadian Shi Renmin Zhengfu Zhuxiao Tudi Shiyong Zheng 
Jiufen An (王超等十四人诉驻马店市人民政府注销土地使用证纠纷案) [Wang Chao and Thirteen 
Others v. Zhumadian City Government] (Henan Zhumadian City Interm. People’s Ct., Jul. 2, 2010) 
(CHINA L. INFO.). 
 20 Dongcheng Qu Tongdu Zhen Shengou Cun Disan Cunmin Xiaozu Sishiyi Hu Cunmin yu 
Dongchuan Qu Renmin Zhengfu Tudi Xingzheng Zhengshou Jiufen Shangsu An (东城区铜都镇深沟
村第三村民小组41户村民与东川区人民政府土地行政征收纠纷上诉案) [41 Households of Shengou 
Village v. Dongchuan District Government of Kunming City] (Yunnan High Ct., May 20, 2009) 
(CHINA L. INFO.). 
 21 The plaintiffs argued that Dongchuan Government paid RMB10, 547,265.60 in total to 
compensate for 105.7 hectares of land in 2006 without completing prior expropriation procedures. It 
was alleged that Dongchuan Government did so in order to avoid compulsory insurance on expropriated 
land at RMB 30,000 per acre, which was required by Kunming City Government starting from Jan. 1 
2007. The compulsory insurance, if applied, would result in RMB 3,171,000 as extra compensation for 
the farmers. The courts confirmed the procedural problems, but did not support this argument, 
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C. Less Tolerance of Procedural Wrongs with Substantive Wrongs  
In the few administrative cases where government decisions were 
invalidated for procedural reasons, substantive review also played a 
role in the courts’ decisions. For example, in Zhang Guoqi and others 
v Zhejiang Provincial Government, Zhang and other villagers 
questioned the legality of the government’s decision to transfer his 
land use right to a developer. The first instance court said that as 
Zhang was only a member of the collective organization, he did not 
have standing to sue the government. The second instance court, the 
High Court of Zhejiang, reversed this decision and invalidated the 
administrative transfer decision on the ground that it is illegal to 
apply administrative transfer to the collectively owned land before  
taking’s procedure. The reason is that administrative transfer only 
applies to state-owned land.22 In this case, although a procedural 
wrong was an important factor to invalidate the government decision, 
there were also substantive rights concerned. That is, whether or not 
the government has the authority to transfer collectively owned land.  
The courts are not always “procedure blind”. They are generally 
indifferent to individual claims for their procedural rights. But the 
courts are likely to support a collective decision based on procedural 
reasons: the majority rule of the collective decisions for land taking, 
for compensation, or for distribution of compensation. 
D. Majority Rule in Land-Taking Disputes 
In general, court decisions regarding land property rights have a 
collectivist color. The following three scenarios were common in the 
sample cases. Firstly, the courts were very likely to reject the claims 
of the individuals based on Article 46 and Article 48 for lack of 
standing. According to the decisions, the major reason is collective 
ownership: the courts asserted that land ownership in rural areas is 
collective, so that individuals, even as members of a collective 
organization, do not have independent standing to claim 
compensation from the government.  
Secondly, courts tend to support the collective organization when 
there are disputes of distribution of compensation between affected 
individuals and collective organizations. That is, the disputes 
between individual villager(s) and the village. In many cases, the 
government would expropriate only a portion of land owned by the 
 
contending that the insurance should be paid to a unified social insurance account, instead of being 
distributed directly to the farmers. 
 22 Zhang Guoqi Deng yu Zhejiang Sheng Renmin Zhengfu Tudi Xingzheng Fuyi Jiufen Shangsu An 
(张国其等与浙江省人民政府土地行政复议纠纷上诉案) [Zhang Guoqi v. Zhejiang Province 
Government ] (Zhejiang High Ct., Apr. 14, 2006) (CHINA L. INFO.). 
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collective. If the land acquired happened to contract out, the affected 
farmers would want to get all the compensation for their losses. In 
this case, legal disputes will arise between the affected farmers (the 
contractors) and the collective, which literally owns the land. In a 
typical dispute like this, the contractor asks for compensation 
according to the size of land that is actually measured and 
compensated by the government, while the village only wants to 
compensate the farmer according to the size of land originally 
assigned to the farmer. The difference in size is usually the result of 
the farmer’s additional effort. However, a court would normally 
support the village if there is a decision made by the village.23 As it 
is either the villagers’ meeting or representatives of the villagers that 
will make the decision, the contracting farmer(s) almost always 
becomes the losing minority in the collective decision. Apparently, it 
is of the the collective’s interest to keep the contractor from getting 
more than the minimal share prescribed by law, which includes only 
compensation for attachments on the land and young crops. And the 
court decisions made it possible for the majority to successfully 
allocate the minority’s share of compensation according to majority 
rule.   
In some cases, courts even support villages’ decision to  
redistribute the compensation to all members rather than to the 
specific farmers who suffered the loss of land. In others, courts also  
supported the collective withhold compensation from some members 
if that was a majority decision. In both scenarios, courts rendered the 
majority’s exploitation of the property interests of the minority, a 
typically rent-seeking behavior. 
E. Summary 
Overall, the 204 cases applying article 46-49 of the Land 
Management Law reveal a number of features of land property rights 
in China:  
(1) The current taking’s clauses in the land property legal system 
is not sufficient to preclude the government from discretionary 
expropriation. It mainly provides important legal ground for 
compensation. Indeed, when the Land Management Law was 
promulgated in 1986, Article 23 stated that it was the farmer’s duty 
 
 23 For example, Xu Peng yu Jinning Xian Kunyang Zhen Xinglong Cunweihui Sanzu Chengbaodi 
Zhengshou Buchang Feiyong Fenpei Jiufen Shangsu An (徐鹏与晋宁县昆阳镇兴隆村委会三组承包
地征收补偿费用分配纠纷上诉案) [Xu Peng v. Xinglong Villagers’ Committee Group 3 of Kunyang 
County of Jinning Township ] (Yunnan Kunming Interm. People’s Ct., Sep. 14, 2009) (CHINA L. 
INFO.). 
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to surrender their land.24 This provision was later revised and then 
disappeared from the Land Management Law. However the 
legislative intent seems to sustain in practice. Almost all legal 
disputes out of land expropriation are confined to compensation 
rather than the legitimacy or justification of government takings. 
Even after the Property Law took into force in 2007, Mr. and Ms. 
Wu, the so-called “most fearless holdout in history”,25 did not seek 
to keep their house against the taking. They sought to stop the 
demolition for higher compensation. In China, this is by no means 
unique or accidental.26 This has made Chinese land right proctection 
different from property rights in other jurisdictions such as the claims 
sought after in Kelo v. City of New London in the United States.27  
(2) Procedural violations of the government agencies are 
considered insignificant compared with substantive violations such 
as abuse of power, in which case land-taking does not fall into the 
realm of the relevant government agency. In reality, neither acts of 
expropriation nor the distribution of compensation can be challenged 
successfully only on purely procedural grounds.  
(3) Compensation of rural land right is discriminatory compared 
with compensation of urban land right. The total amount of 
compensation for the collectively owned land is unilaterally 
determined by government agencies responsible for land 
expropriation in rural areas. The decision-making process cannot be 
challenged in the courts. In this sense, rural rights holders are 
discriminated compared with those right holders in the urban areas: 
according to the 1994 Urban Real Estate Management Law, 
negotiation of price is required and the government will lose the case 
if it fails to comply with the negotiation and appraisal procedures. 
Thus land-taking law in China provides unequal protection of 
property rights between rural and urban areas.  
(4) The current collective decision making process provided by 
the Land Management Law creates rent-seeking opportunity for the 
 
 24 Tudi Guanli Fa (中华人民共和国土地管理法) [Land Administration Law] (promulgated by the 
Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Jun. 25, 1986, effective Jan. 1, 1987) (1986) art. 23 (CHINA L. 
INFO.). 
 25 See, e.g., Howard W. French, In China, Fight Over Development Creates a Star, N. Y. TIMES 
(Mar. 26, 2007), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/26/world/asia/26cnd-china.html?ex= 
1332561600&en=a821e4ef4e73851a&ei=5090. 
 26 In early 2005, collective resistance of proposed demolitions caused large-scale collision between 
the villagers and the local government in Dongzhou County of Guangdong and Dingzhou County of 
Hebei. These protests also did not aim at preventing government taking but instead sought fair 
compensation. Many other “property right heroes” like Liu Zhengyou of Zigong and Qian Huiyun of 
Leqing, launched long-term resistance against the government through legal or social proceedings for 
compensation as well. Even in the most recent Tang Fuzhen event, Ms. Tang committed suicide 
because she disagreed with the compensation rather than the taking itself. 
 27 Kelo v. City of New London, 125 S. Ct. 2655 (2005). 
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collective organization to take the advantage of individual land right 
holders who suffered from the government taking. For land 
compensation, village members were permitted to claim loss of 
attachments and young crops and sometimes resettlement subsidies. 
However, individual farmers cannot challenge the total compensation 
for the expropriation. After 2011, the SPC’s judicial interpretation 
permits a majority of the farmers in the collective organization to sue 
the government if the villagers’ committee refuses to do so.28 But 
this does not resolve the problem of individuals or households who 
claim for a share of the compensation that differs from what is 
determined by the collective. Since the collective, either the actually 
majority of the villagers or the villagers’ committee is not necessarily 
the actual victim of land-taking. Therefore the collective tends to 
agree with the government compensation plan or even tries to 
redistribute the compensation at the cost of the land use right 
holder’s interest.  
III. INSTITUTIONAL EXPLANATIONS FOR WEAK JUDICIAL 
ENFORCEMENT 
Many have noticed of the weaknesses of land property rights in 
China. Some lay the blame the vacuum and vagueness in relevant 
laws and regulations. 29  Others have commented on the village 
leaders’ incentive to readjust contracting land for rent-seeking 
purposes30 and local governments’ incentives to sell or lease lands as 
extra-budgetary revenue. 31  These factors provide important 
explanations for the insecure property system in China. However, the 
fact that judges tend to be indifferent to the claims of individual land 
right holders deserves further investigation. This is because the 
courts’ lack of sympathy for individual claims may constitute an 
independent institutional reason for weak property rights in China.  
Judges may curtail property rights or promote property rights in any 
jurisdiction. During adjudicatory proceedings, judges do not simply 
apply rules, they can make important legal changes through statutory 
 
 28 Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shenli Sheji Nongcun Jiti Tudi Xingzheng Anjian Ruogan Wenti 
de Guiding (最高人民法院关于审理涉及农村集体土地行政案件若干问题的规定) [Provisions of the 
Supreme People’s Court on Several Issues concerning the Trial of Administrative Cases Involving 
Rural Collectively-owned Land] (promulgated by Sup. People’s Ct., Aug. 7, 2011, effective Sep. 5 
2011) art. 3 (CHINA L. INFO.). 
 29 See Erie, supra note 1, at 37; Deininger and Jin, supra note 6. 
 30 Brandt, Rozelle ＆ Turner, supra note 6. See also Chen Jianbo (陈剑波), Nongdi Zhidu: Suoyou 
Quan Wenti Haishi Weituo Daili Wenti (农地制度：所有权问题还是委托─代理问题) [Collective 
Ownership of Rural Land: Tenure or Principal-Agent Problem?], 7 JINGJI YANJIU (经济研究) [ECON. 
REV.] 83, 83-91 (2006) (offering a full account of views from economists regarding the failure of rural 
land management in China). 
 31 Keliang & Prosterman, supra note 2. 
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interpretation or legal application. Therefore, the same provision may 
be enforced inconsistently or even in a distortive way. This is 
especially the case in China because the SPC is authorized to make 
judicial interpretation abstractly. This section explores some 
institutional reasons for the courts’ behaviors in the way of applying 
the relevant legal provisions.  
A. Collective Property Rights as an Institutional Barrier for 
Enforcement 
As discussed above, the results of the litigations have a 
collectivist color when disputes between the collective organization 
and its members occur. Table 4 below categorizes the plaintiffs into 
5 groups: collective organizations, local residents with contracted 
land (LRC), local residents without contracted land (LRNC), 
non-resident with contracted land (NRC), and non-resident without 
contracted land (NRNC). We also classify the entitlements to land 
property and rights to compensation upon expropriation into the 
following 4 types: right to compensation of land, right to resettlement 
subsidies, right to compensation for attachments on the land, and 
right to compensation for young crops on the land. Table 4 shows the 
patterns of remedies courts tend to provide for different categories of 
plaintiffs. 
 
Table 4 Patterns of Compensation for Expropriation 
 Compensati
on of Land 
Resettleme
nt Subsidy 
Compensati
on for 
attachments 
Compensati
on for young 
crops 
Collectiv
es  
Yes Yes No No 
LRC Yes-share Yes-share Yes Yes 
LRNC Yes-share 
but with 
exception 
Yes-share 
but with 
exception 
No No 
NRC No No Yes Yes 
NRNC No but with 
exception 
No but 
with 
exception 
No No 
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The basic understanding of remedial rights to land property as 
provided the the court decisions can be summarized as follows: 
Firstly, only collectives have the right to compensation of land and 
resettlement. Individuals can only have a share of the compensation. 
Therefore, no individual farmer in a collective may represent the 
collective to challenge the overall compensation plan, unless he is the 
head of the village with proper authorization.  
Secondly, a local resident with contracted land will get 
compensation for attachments and young crops, which are direct 
losses due to the expropriation. However, in many cases, local 
resident with contracted land will only receive an average share from 
the compensation of land and resettlement fees. A local resident 
without contracted land may or may not receive any share of the 
compensation, depending on whether or not he actually lives within 
the community. For example, a new resident was excluded from a 
share of land compensation because his actual residence was 
elsewhere and he did not have any investment in the village.32 A 
woman who married out and left her contracted land to her family 
received 40% of the average share of compensation.33 In another 
case, the first-instance court held that villagers without contracted 
land did not have the right to land compensation. However, the 
second-instance court revoked the first-instance decision and 
instructed the village to distribute the relevant share to the resident 
villagers.34 
Thirdly, non-local residents with contracted land will only receive 
compensation for attachments and young crops. Most disputes of this 
type occurred when the villages contracted out non-arable lands, 
such as land for fruit trees, fishponds, riverbanks or forests. These 
contracts are not considered household-based contracts, but regular 
business contracts. Consequently, land taking is considered as 
“changed circumstances”35 that lead to termination of the contracts. 
If the contract contains a provision for this circumstance, the court 
will respect the agreement. If the contract does not provide for 
compensation of early termination, courts may ask the village 
 
 32 Liang Yongyi Deng yu Foshan Shi Sanshui Qu Lubao Zhen Silian Cunmin Weiyuanhui Junrong 
Cun Tudi Buchangfei Jiufen Shangsu An (梁泳仪等与佛山市三水区芦苞镇四联村民委员会君荣村
土地补偿费纠纷上诉案) [Liang Yongyi and Others v. Junrong Villagers’ Committee of Lubao 
County ] (Guangdong Foshan Interm. People’s Ct., Jun. 6, 2006) (CHINA L. INFO.). 
 33 Zhong Guichang yu Qin Caidi Deng Nongye Chengbao Hetong Jiufen Shangsu An (钟桂常与秦
财娣等农业承包合同纠纷上诉案) [Zhong Guichang and Qin Caidi Agricultural Contracting Dispute 
Case ] (Guangdong Guangzhou Interm. People’s Ct., May 30, 2007) (CHINA L. INFO.). 
 34 Gumou yu Pingshan Zhen Deduo Cunweihui Hualong Cun Xiaozu Chengbao Tudi Zhengshou 
Buchang Feiyong Fenpei Jiufen Shangsu An (谷某与屏山镇地多村委会花龙村小组承包土地征收补
偿费用分配纠纷上诉案) [Ms. Gu v. Hualong Village Group of Hualong Village, Pingshan County ] 
(Yunnan Kunming Interm. People’s Ct., Dec. 1, 2008) (CHINA L. INFO.). 
 35 In Chinese, it is phrased as “情事变更”. 
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collective to compensate the contractor with a portion of the 
compensation of land. However, the compensation is not considered 
a remedy for loss of land right, but for breach of contract.36 
Finally, non-local residents without contracted land will not get 
compensation as a rule with certain exceptions: one of the exceptions 
could be the retroactive effect of the claimant’s membership status.  
If the claimant had been a member villager when the takings decision 
was officially made, the court may support his claim for a share of 
the compensation. However, courts have divided opinions on 
whether or not land taking compensations are inheritable interests.  
B. Judicial Politics As Disincentives for Enforcement  
This has been a default understanding for many studies of 
Chinese land disputes, which rarely delineate courts decisions and 
local government taking decisions. Even among legal scholars, it is 
widely believed that local courts are just branches of local 
governments or at least, are financially and politically dependent on 
local governments. First of all, local judges are appointed by local 
legislatures in which government officials constitute the majority. 
The courts will deliver annual report to the local assembly as a way 
of accountability. If the local government officials are unhappy with 
the courts decisions, they may vote against the court reports and put 
the courts in a very difficult place.  
Secondly, the presidents and some vice presidents of courts are 
usually former government officials or may be appointed as 
government officials in the future. This creates certain real or 
potential peer relationships between the senior court judges and other 
government officials. Given that court cases, especially complicated 
and difficult cases will be submitted to the adjudicatory committee 
headed by the president, composed of the vice presidents and some 
other senior judges, the presidents and vice presidents have 
significant impact on the court decisions. 37  Therefore, the 
 
 36 Wei Youqiang Su Jianyang Shi Shiqiao Zhen Tongche Cun Jiuzu Tudi Zhengyong BuchangFei 
Fenpei Jiufen An (魏尤强诉简阳市石桥镇筒车村九组土地征用补偿费分配纠纷案) [Wei Youqiang 
v. Tongche Village 9th Group of Shiqiao County] (Sichuan Jianyang People’s Ct., Oct. 24, 2007) 
(CHINA L. INFO.); Gansu Lintao Xian Xindian Zhen Kangjiaya Cun Cunmin Weiyuanhui yu Lanzhou 
Tielu Ju Chaiqian Buchang Jiufen Zaishen An (甘肃临洮县辛店镇康家崖村村民委员会与兰州铁路
局拆迁补偿纠纷再审案) [Lan Zhou Railroad v. Kangjiaai Villagers’ Committee of Xindian County, 
Linyao Township of Gansu] (Gansu High Ct., Dec. 29, 2006) (CHINA L. INFO.). 
 37 Difficult, complicated and major cases as well as cases the collegial panels find difficult to deal 
with should be reviewed or adjudicated by the adjudicatory committee before the court decisions are 
issued. The president or the responsible vice president shall decide whether or not a specific case should 
be submitted to the adjudicatory committed, see Zuigao Renmin Fayuan guanyu Yinfa Guanyu Gaige 
he Wanshan Renmin Fayuan Shenpan Weiyuanhui Zhidu de Shishi Yijian de Tongzhi (最高人民法院
关于印发关于改革和完善人民法院审判委员会制度的实施意见的通知) [Notice of the Supreme 
People’s Court on Issuing the Implementation Opinions on Reforming and Improving the Judicial 
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presidents tend to choose to be prudent when reviewing government 
decisions.    
Thirdly, courts are financially dependent on the governments at 
various levels38, which have at least two consequences for the courts’ 
attitude to land disputes: first of all, courts might prefer to reject 
administrative cases because they do not benefit from the fees 
collected from administrative lawsuits. Unlike civil cases from which 
the courts collect fees according to the disputed amount of money, in 
most administrative cases, courts take a flat fare of 50 RMB.39 Due 
to the fact that many courts still rely on the litigation fees to 
survive,40 it is unprofitable to take administrative cases of any kind. 
Then secondly, since local government revenue is the major resource 
for local court funding and that local government revenue is highly 
dependent on land expropriation, courts may have the incentive to 
assist the governments in maximizing land-taking profit by the court 
decions.  
The circular of Guangxi High Court, which instructed Guangxi 
courts to reject land disputes, supports the above observation. The 
very low rate of success in administrative litigations in this and other 
empirical studies also supports this conclusion. It is especially 
notable that most first instance decisions tend to support government 
decision, while second instance courts decisions are more likely to 
invalidate government decisions or support individual litigants. This 
makes sense in term of the degree of dependence of different levels 
of courts. The fact that lower courts are generally more dependent on 
the governments have made them more sympathetic to takings 
decisions whereas the higher courts are not.  
However, there is also at least one institutional argument 
unsupportive of the above-mentioned hypothesis. The adjudicatory 
system in China is based on the finality of second instance review 
with unlimited retrial as exceptions. Even if local courts feel they are 
obligated to support local government agencies, higher-level second 
 
Committee System of the People’s Court] (promulgated by Sup. People’s Ct., Jan. 11, 2010, effective 
Jan. 11 2010) (CHINA L. INFO.). 
 38 Caizhengbu Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Yinfa Renmin Fayuan Caiwu Guanli Zanxing Banfa 
de Tongzhi (财政部、最高人民法院关于印发人民法院财务管理暂行办法的通知) [Notice of the 
Ministry of Finance and the Supreme People's Court on Temporary Measures for Finance Management 
of People’s Courts] (promulgated by Sup. People’s Ct. & Ministry of Fin., Jan. 11, 2010, effective Jan. 
11 2010) (CHINA L. INFO.). 
 39 Susong Feiyong Jiaona Banfa (诉讼费用交纳办法) [Measures on the Payment of Litigation 
Costs] (promulgated by St. Council, Dec., 19, 2006, effective Apr., 1, 2007) (CHINA L. INFO.). 
 40 Ting Gong, Dependent Judiciary and Uncountable Judges: Judicial Corruption in Contemporary 
China, 4(2) CHINA REV., 33, 33-54 (2004); He Xin (贺欣 ), Zhongguo Fayuan de Caizheng Buzu yu 
Sifa Fubai (中国法院的财政不足与司法腐败 ) [Insufficient Financial Resources and Judicial 
Corruption in Chinese Courts], 105 ERSHIYI SHIJI (二十一世纪) [TWENTY FIRST CENTURY] 12, 12-23 
(2008). 
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instance courts do not share the same degree of solidarity with the 
challenged agencies of lower level government. This is especially the 
case when the intermediate courts or high court find the local 
government superseded the authority of higher-level government 
agencies or national laws. This invites further explanation of the 
courts’ behavioral choices in land-taking cases.  
C. Further Deterrence from China’s Statutory Interpretation System 
The logic of this argument is as follows. According to the 
Constitution, the National People’s Congress Standing Committee 
(the NPCSC) has authority to interpret law. Although the SPC and 
the Supreme People’s Procuratorial(the SPP hereinafter) are also 
authorized to interpret laws when applying statutes for specific cases, 
their interpretative authority are considered derivative or subordinate 
to the NPCSC’s. This secondary authority was made clear after the 
NPCSC issued a decision in 2005, which requires the SPC and the 
SPP) to submit their judicial interpretations for review 30 days after 
the promulgation.41  
Moreover, since the CCP is the dominant authority in every 
aspect of Chinese political life, the courts also have to conform their 
decisions to the Party’s policies regarding rural and legal issues. To 
be precise, the courts and the judges are personally responsible to the 
Committee for Politics and Law at various levels, especially 
instructions from the Central Committee for Politics and Law (the 
CCPL). According to the official website of the CCPL, its major 
function is to unify the minds and actions of respective departments 
according to the Party’s guidelines, roadmaps and polices, and to 
deliberate and make polices related to politics and law. The so-called 
“politics and law departments” include courts and the 
procuratorials,42 which therefore are inevitably subordinate to the 
Party’s policies and the specific instructions from the CCPL.  
The courts’ secondary authority role can be easily demonstrated 
by the policy shift made by the SPC around 2004. Before 2004, the 
SPC’s basic policy over farmers’ claim for land compensation was 
judicial deference, which in practice meant refusal to review such 
claims on the basis of lack of standing. In a response to the local high 
court, the SPC made it clear that only disputes over compensation for 
 
 41 Sifa Jieshi Beian Shencha Gongzuo Chengxu (司法解释备案审查工作程序) [Working Process 
for Record and Review of Judicial Interpretation], (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s 
Cong., Dec. 16, 2005, effective Dec. 16, 2005) (2005) (Literally speaking, this is not a NPCSC decision 
but a decision made by the chairs of NPCSC. But in practice, it has a legal effect to subordinate the 
judicial interpretation. Whether this decision is constitutional or legitimate is another interesting 
question). 
 42 See generally the official website of the CCPL, http://www.chinapeace.org.cn/ (last visited at 
Apr. 22, 2015). 
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attachments and young crops will be accepted, as these are “disputes 
among equal parties.” 43  All kinds of administrative litigations 
against government agencies, which expropriate lands from the 
farmers as well as other claims between the farmers and the 
collective organizations, were excluded. Due to the 2004 
Constitutional Amendments, the SPC extended the judicial power to 
disputes between individual farmers and collectives regarding land 
compensation. The jurisdiction was extended to resettlement the 
following year. With the promulgation of 2005 Supreme People’s 
Court Interpretation Regarding Laws Applied in Adjudication of 
Rural Land Contract Disputes,44 courts started to play more active 
roles in adjudicating land disputes, especially in allocation of land 
compensation among the villagers’ committee and individual 
farmers.  
In a press conference held by the SPC, the then Vice-President 
Huang Songyou explained the policy concerns and the theory of 
property rights underlying the new interpretation. According to 
Huang, disputes over allocations of compensation for contracted land 
had become a prominent and complicated problem; and petitions of 
this type constituted a considerable proportion of farmer-related 
complaints. Based on the principle set by State Council’s Decisions 
on Deepening Reform and Tightening Land Management,45 any 
compensation for land expropriation should be mainly distributed to 
the farmers. As a result, the SPC for the first time viewed 
resettlement subsidy and land compensation as land rights of 
individuals as opposed to rights of the collective: resettlement 
subsidy is considered as compensation for farmers’ land contracting 
right; and land compensation is taken as the membership right of the 
farmers in a collective community. 46   
 
 43 Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Xu Zhijun Deng Shiyi Ren Su Longquan Shi Longyuan Zhen 
Diba Cun Cunweihui Tudi Zhengyong Buchangfei Fenpei Jiufen Yian de Pifu (最高人民法院关于徐
志君等十一人诉龙泉市龙渊镇第八村村委会土地征用补偿费分配纠纷一案的批复) [Supreme 
Court Response to Xue Zhijun and Other 11 People v. 8th Villager’s Committee of Longquan City 
Longyuan Township] (promulgated by Sup. People’s Ct., Aug. 19, 2008, effective Aug. 19 2008) 
(CHINA L. INFO.). 
 44 Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shenli Sheji Nongcun Tudi Chengbao Jiufen Anjian Shiyong 
Falü Wenti de Jieshi (最高人民法院关于审理涉及农村土地承包纠纷案件适用法律问题的解释) 
[Interpretation of the Supreme People’s Court Regarding Laws Applied in Adjudication of Rural Land 
Contract Disputes] (promulgated by Sup. People’s Ct. Jul. 29, 2005, effective Sep. 1, 2005) (CHINA L. 
INFO.). 
 45 Guowu Yuan Guanyu Shenhua Gaige Yange Tudi Guanli de Jueding (国务院关于深化改革 严
格土地管理的决定 ) [State Council’s Decision on Deepening Reform and Tightening Land 
Administration] (promulgated by St. Council, Oct., 21, 2004, effective Oct., 21, 2004) (CHINA L. 
INFO.). 
 46 Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Fuyuanzhang Huang Songyou Jiu Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shenli 
Sheji Nongcun Tudi Chengbao Jiufen Anjian Shiyong Falü Wenti de Jieshi Da Jizhe Wen (最高人民法
院副院长黄松有就最高人民法院关于审理涉及农村土地承包纠纷案件适用法律问题的解释答记
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Ever since 2008, courts have been under even more intensive 
political pressure to comply judicial polices with political policies 
after top CCP leader required the judiciary to apply “Three 
Supremacies” in their work. According to the new requirements, 
judges shall always keep in mind the supremacy of the CCP’s course, 
the supremacy of the people’s general interests, and the supremacy of 
the Constitution.47 Although many tried to interpret the three in 
harmony with each other 48 , there is no doubt that judges are 
expressly required to place politics together with law or even before 
law. 49  Correspondingly, although the SPC has produced new 
instructions and guidelines for lower courts to adjudicate land 
disputes, these are responses to political policies of the new 
leadership rather than responses to the claims of farmers. It may be 
too extreme to conclude that these new instructions will not help 
farmers’ protect their land property rights in specific cases. However, 
it will not be surprising if court judges consistently prefer “bigger 
plan” of the government at the cost of the stability of land property 
rights of the farmers such as development and social stability. 
 
者问) [Vice President of State Council Huang Songyou Answered Journalists’ Questions About State 
Council’s Decision on Deepening Reform and Tightening Land Administration], CHINACOURT ORG. 
(Jul. 29, 2005), http://old.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=171297. 
 47 This was originally presented by Hu Jintao, in his address to All China Politics and Law 
Representatives Meeting with Senior Judges and Prosecutors on Dec.26, 2007 and was soon promoted 
by Chief Justice Wang Shengjun as the guiding principles for adjudicatory works. 
 48 See Jinyibu Shenhua “Sange Zhishang” Zhidao Sixiang de Lilun Yanjiu—Renmin Fanyuan 
Gongzuo Zhidao Sixiang Lilun Yantaohui Xuezhe Fayan Zhaiyao (进一步深化“三个至上”指导思想
的理论研究——人民法院工作指导思想理论研讨会学者发言摘要) [Further Deepening Theoretical 
Study of Three Supremacies—A Summary of Scholars’ Remarks in the Symposium of Theoretical 
Guidelines for People’s Courts], RENMIN FAYUAN BAO (人民法院报) [PEOPLE’S CT. DAILY], Jun. 26, 
2009, available at http://www.chinacourt.org/article/detail/2009/06/id/363600.shtml. 
 49 Wang is the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. He urged that judges at all levels shall keep in 
line with the socialist path and the CCP’s leadership so as to ensure the political correctness of the 
people’s courts and to ensure that the courts serve the larger plan of the CCP and the State, see Wang 
Shengjun (王胜俊), Shenru Guanche Luoshi Dang de Shiqida Jingshen Zhashi Zuohao Renmin Fayuan 
Gexiang Gongzuo (深入贯彻落实党的十七大精神  扎实做好人民法院各项工作) [Thoroughly 
Implement the Principles of the 17th CCP Congress, Do All Work of the Courts in A Down-to-earth 
Manner], 16 QIUSHI (求是) [QIUSHI]3, 3-5 (2008). 
 49 Wang is the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. He urged that judges at all levels shall keep in 
line with the socialist path and the CCP’s leadership so as to ensure the political correctness of the 
people’s courts and to ensure that the courts serve the larger plan of the CCP and the State, see Wang 
Shengjun (王胜俊), Shenru Guanche Luoshi Dang de Shiqida Jingshen Zhashi Zuohao Renmin Fayuan 
Gexiang Gongzuo (深入贯彻落实党的十七大精神  扎实做好人民法院各项工作) [Thoroughly 
Implement the Principles of the 17th CCP Congress, Do All Work of the Courts in A Down-to-earth 
Manner], 16 QIUSHI (求是) [QIUSHI]3, 3-5 (2008). 
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IV. CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS FOR PROPERTY RIGHTS 
ENTRENCHMENT IN CHINA 
By examining the 204 cases across the country, this article finds 
that although the Land Management Law has provided procedural 
requirements as well as compensation computation methods for land 
takings, claims based on these clauses may be supported only if (1) 
they are cases that simultaneously involved with errors for 
substantive legal reasons; or (2) the government agencies in question 
do not have the authority of expropriation, such as county level 
government or otherwise unauthorized agencies. Therefore, for the 
courts, Article 46 is mainly understood as a clause to authorize the 
governments at or above the county level as expropriators, as 
opposed to a due process of law clause to restrain the government 
eminent domain power. For the same reason, Article 48 of the Land 
Management Law is considered irrelevant to illegal takings. The 
courts either refuse to examine the proprieties of the takings decision 
or reject the claim on the basis of violation of legal procedures.  
Another finding is that the courts’ decision demonstrated an 
ideological preference for collectivism in land property rights. This 
finding is supported by the courts decisions in favor of collective 
decisions made by the village at he cost of affected individuals’ 
interests. Correspondingly, the courts’ understanding of Article 47 
and Article 49 is that the compensation should be paid to the village 
instead of affected individual farmers. Some may argue that this is 
derived from collective ownership of the rural land. However, with 
the Land Contracting Law expressly providing for the land use right 
of the affected individuals, this interpretation can only be understood 
as the courts’ preference to the collective claim over individual land 
property rights.  
The judicial perception of land property rights is consistent with 
the socialist ideology of collective ownership. However, a more 
important reason for the pattern tends to be the self-image of the 
court as the secondary authority to interpret the law and to enforce 
state policies.  
The observations above are mainly descriptive and have focused 
on the courts’ enforcement of the procedural requirements set by the 
Land Management Law. But it also have some theoretical 
implications for improvement of land property law. First of all, the 
above observation would disagree with the interpretative approach. 
According to this approach, in order to prevent illegal takings, 
relevant statutes should introduce a whole list of items categorized as 
public interests.50 This approach is objectionable according to the 
 
 50 Jinguang & Kai, supra note 2. 
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above observation. Because when the courts apply judicial deference 
to interpret  “public interest”, almost any project can be viewed as 
“public interest”. Indeed, this approach has been proved not very 
effective after the “Regulation on Expropriation and Compensation 
of Houses on State-owned Land in Urban Areas” was promulgated 
with the relevant provision.51  
Another implication relates to the idea of privatization. 
Privatization seems to be a convenient way to address the ‘tragedy of 
the commons’ in rural areas. However, privatization does not 
preclude nationalization or the eminent domain power unless an 
independent authority, such as the judiciary, can restrain the 
arbitrariness of state power effectively. Otherwise, it makes little 
difference with or without privatization of collective ownership. 
Large-scale demolition of private houses in urban areas makes good 
illustration of the vulnerability of private property. The fact is, 
although urban real properties have been privatized, the courts still 
fail to provide strong protection according to the statutory 
entitlement.  
Alternatively, the empirical study seems to suggest that, (1) it is 
important to reconstruct property rights in the rural areas, especially 
land use rights so as to provide the equivalent degree of protection as 
land use rights in urban areas. (2) Another possible reform should 
aim to recognize the membership rights in the collective 
organization, without necessarily abolishing the collective ownership 
regime altogether. (3) Last but not least, improvement in resolving 
land property issues in China requires the empowerment of the 
judiciary, by relaxing the financial and personal dependence between 
the local governments and local courts, authorizing the courts to 
review government land taking decisions before they are enforced, 
and eventually, vesting the judiciary with full-fledged interpretative 
power of the statues. The proposed prescriptions will need 
institutional change in the constitutional and legal system. But the 
arrangements are consistent with China’s national policy of rule of 
law and sustainable development in a long run.  
 
 
 
 
 51 Article 8 of the Regulation lays out a list of projects that may be considered as ‘public interest’, 
but it does not preclude other projects that are not listed in the provision, which leaves room for further 
interpretation in the law enforcement proceedings, see Guoyou Tudi Shang Fangwu Zhengshou yu 
Buchang Tiaoli (国有土地上房屋征收与补偿条例) [Regulation on the Expropriation of Buildings on 
State-owned Land and Compensation] (promulgated by St. Council, Jan., 21, 2011, effective Jan., 21, 
2011) art. 8 (CHINA L. INFO.). 
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APPENDIX: TEXT OF ARTICLES 46-49 OF THE LAND MANAGEMENT 
LAW52 
Article 46: (Procedure and qualification for expropriation) Where 
land is to be expropriated by the State, the expropriation shall, after 
approval is obtained through legal procedure, be announced by 
people’s governments at or above the county level, which shall help 
execute the expripriation. 
Units and individuals that own or have the right to the use of the 
land under expropriation shall, within the time limit fixed in the 
announcement, register for compensation with the land 
administration department of the local people’s government by 
presenting their certificates of land ownership or land-use right. 
Article 47 (Computation of compensation) Land expropriated 
shall be compensated for on the basis of its original purpose of use. 
Compensation for expropriated cultivated land shall include 
compensation for land, resettlement subsidies and compensation for 
attachments and young crops on the expropriated land. 
Compensation for expropriated of cultivated land shall be six to ten 
times the average annual output value of the expropriated land, 
calculated on the basis of three years preceding such expripriation. 
Resettlement subsidies for expropriated cultivated land shall be 
calculated according to the agricultural population needing to be 
resettled. The agricultural population needing to be resettled shall be 
calculated by dividing the area of expropriated cultivated land by the 
average area of the original cultivated land per person of the unit the 
land of which is expropriated. The standard resettlement subsidies to 
be divided among members of the agricultural population needing 
resettlement shall be four to six times the average annual output 
value of the expropriated cultivated land calculated on the basis of 
three years preceding such expropriation. However, the maximum 
resettlement subsidies for each hectare of the expropriated cultivated 
land shall not exceed fifteen times its average annual output value 
calculated on the basis of three years preceding such expropriation. 
Rates of land compensation and resettlement subsidies for 
expropriation of other types of land shall be prescribed by provinces, 
autonomous regions and municipalities directly under the Central 
 
 52 This is based on the official translated provided by the NPCSC, see Quanguo Renmin Daibiao 
Dahui Changwu Weiyuanhui Guanyu Xiugai Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Tudi Guanli Fa de Jueding 
(全国人民代表大会常务委员会关于修改中华人民共和国土地管理法的决定) [Decision of the 
Standing Committee of the National People's Congress on Amending the Land Administration Law of 
the People's Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 28, 
2004, effective Aug. 28, 2004) (2004), available at http://law.npc.gov.cn/page/browseotherlaw.cbs?rid= 
en&bs=30036&anchor=0#go0 (last visited at Apr. 22, 2015). 
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Government with reference to the rates of compensation and 
resettlement subsidies for expropriation of cultivated land. 
Rates of compensation for attachments and young crops on 
expropriated land shall be prescribed by provinces, autonomous 
regions and municipalities directly under the Central Government. 
For expropriation of vegetable plots in city suburbs, the land users 
shall pay towards a development and construction fund for new 
vegetable plots in accordance with the relevant regulations of the 
State. 
If land compensation and resettlement subsidies paid in 
accordance with the provisions of the second paragraph in this 
Article are still insufficient to enable the peasants needing 
resettlement to maintain their original living standards, the 
resettlement subsidies may be increased upon approval by people’s 
governments of provinces, autonomous regions and municipalities 
directly under the Central Government. However, the total land 
compensation and resettlement subsidies shall not exceed 30 times 
the average annual output value of the expropriated land calculated 
on the basis of three years preceding such expropriation. 
The State Council may, in light of the level of social and 
economic development and under special circumstances, raise the 
rates of land compensation and resettlement subsidies for 
expropriation of cultivated land. 
Article 48 (obligation of the government to publicize the 
compensation) Once a plan for compensation and resettlement 
subsidies for expropriated land is decided on, the local people’s 
government concerned shall make it known to the general public and 
solicit comments and suggestions from the collective economic 
organizations, the land of which is expropriated, and the peasants. 
Article 49 (obligation of the collective organization to publicize 
the compensation) The rural collective economic organization, the 
land of which is expropriated, shall accept supervision by making 
known to its members the income and expenses of the compensation 
received for land expropriation. 
The compensation and other charges paid to the unit for its land 
expropriated are forbidden to be embezzled or misappropriated. 
